Abstract
This study investigates match-fixing employing a 2-player contest in an experimental
setting. Subjects compete in a real-effort task and are bribed onetime to self-sabotage.
Based on Becker’s deterrence hypothesis, the effectiveness of deterrent factors
is analyzed via different treatments applying an expected utility framework. Results
show that the majority of participants do not maximize their monetary payoff, that
increasing detection probability has a higher deterring effect on bribe acceptance
compared to severity of monetary punishment, and that participants with lower performance
levels were more likely to accept bribes. Implications are derived for sport
governing bodies to operate against match-fixing.
setting. Subjects compete in a real-effort task and are bribed onetime to self-sabotage.
Based on Becker’s deterrence hypothesis, the effectiveness of deterrent factors
is analyzed via different treatments applying an expected utility framework. Results
show that the majority of participants do not maximize their monetary payoff, that
increasing detection probability has a higher deterring effect on bribe acceptance
compared to severity of monetary punishment, and that participants with lower performance
levels were more likely to accept bribes. Implications are derived for sport
governing bodies to operate against match-fixing.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Sport Economics |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-29 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 13.11.2022 |