Invariant Representations in Grounded Cognition Theories: Theory and Evidence

We review and test theories of grounded cognition (GC) and their predictions about invariant representations (e.g., representations of momentum, gravity, friction), hypothesizing that abstract concepts can be grounded in these. Invariant representations form an integral part of object representations like other attributes such as an object’s weight or position. E.g., a flying ball is not represented just as heavy and left, but also as having momentum. GC approaches examine how abstract concepts gain meaning, positing that abstract concepts consist of experiential representations (e.g., of sensorimotor states). This view would therefore predict that invariant representations, similarly experiential, should also ground concepts. Yet, GC theories and experiments consistently neglect invariant representations. We discuss this gap, forming an outlook for future research. Furthermore, we test this hypothesis using a measure of two objects’ perceived momentum, one successful, another non-successful. Indeed, the object described as successful is perceived as having more momentum. This suggests that the abstract concept of success is grounded in the invariant momentum.